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INTRODUCTION
The assumption that international law influences governmental choices
and international outcomes underlies the work of legal scholars and
practitioners alike. Indeed, explicating the law is arguably only useful to the
extent that international rules have an impact on outcomes that themselves are
deeply valued by sovereign governments, private actors, or the international
community at large. Certainly, most legal scholars and practitioners believe
that the rules at the center of their analysis do indeed matter to the design of
foreign policy and the conduct of international relations.' Scholars of
international relations, steeped in "realist" theories of international relations
and critical of the inferences drawn from a select (biased) set of cases,
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however, have been far more skeptical.2 Despite broadening interest in
whether and to what extent international law influences state behavior,3 the
evidence and argumentation remains highly inconclusive.
This Article seeks to contribute to our understanding of international law
compliance by focusing on a particular area-the public international law of
money. This is a critical terrain for examining compliance with international
commitments, for money has traditionally been one of the key aspects of
national sovereignty. The creation, valuation, and convertibility of a state's
national currency have long been considered a national legal prerogative,4 as
well as a potent symbol of national autonomy.5 Yet, after World War II,
governments established for the first time in history a public international law
6of money, which required adherents to maintain par values for their
currencies, maintain a unified exchange rate regime, keep their current
accounts free from restrictions, and consult on a regular basis regarding these
matters. The development of these rules allows us to ask and attempt to
answer questions that go to the very purposes of international law itself: Why
do sovereign governments commit themselves to international rules that will
bind their future behavior? Once committed, what conditions are associated
with compliance? Do governments that make specific behavioral
commitments behave any differently than similarly situated countries who do
not commit?
The argument developed here suggests that an international legal
commitment is a signaling device that governments use to convince private
market actors as well as other governments of a serious intent to eschew the
proscribed behavior. The commitment improves access to future benefits:
international trade and investment, capital flows, and other benefits of good
standing in the international economic community. In order to be convincing,
however, such a commitment has to be credible. Hence, governments tend to
make such commitments when they are in a plausible position to comply with
the legal requirements in question. Moreover, as more countries commit
themselves to a rule, non-commitment sends a strong negative signal about a
government's willingness to comply, which explains the "snowballing" or
"momentum" effects observed with respect to international law commitments
2. The best contemporary account is that of George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News
About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INT'L ORG. 379 (1996).
3. For example, "Implementation, Compliance, and Effectiveness" was the theme of the
1997 annual meeting of the American Society for International Law. See Shirley A. Whitfield, Testing
the Effectiveness of the International Court of Justice: The Nuclear Weapons Case, 91 AM. SOC'Y INT'L
L. PROC. 1 (1998).
4. See Joseph Gold, Legal Models for the International Regulation of Exchange Rates, 82
MICH. L. REv. 1533, 1533 (1984) (citing Case of Serbian Loans, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) Nos. 21-22, at
44).
5. See generally BENJAMIN J. COHEN, THE GEOGRAPHY OFMONEY (1998).
6. For a discussion of exactly what comprises the "public international law of money," see
M.R. SCHUSTER, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MONEY 1-19 (1973). For a history of the
international monetary system from a legal perspective, see generally KENNETH W. DAM, THE RULES OF
THE GAME: REFORM AND EVOLUTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM (1982); and Joseph
Gold, Public International Law in the International Monetary System, 38 Sw. L.J. 799 (1984).
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in a number of issue areas. 7 Governments comply with their legal
commitments largely to preserve their reputation for providing a stable
framework for the protection of property rights and to enjoy future economic
benefits on favorable terms. Indeed, there is suggestive evidence that the more
a polity has invested in such a reputation, the less willing a government will
be to tarnish its reputation through non-compliance with its international legal
obligations. Moreover, the international context in which reputations are
developed and defended is crucial to the compliance decision. Rampant
violation by other governments, especially those in the same region, reduces
the costs of non-compliance as investors find it more difficult to "punish" any
one violator. Conversely, the damage to one's reputation is amplified if the
government is one of a handful of violators in its region.
The final argument of this Article is that international law has a
significant impact on governments' behavior. Even in the face of conditions
that make compliance difficult-the crucial test for the impact of law on
compliance behavior-international legal commitments encourage states to
try that much harder to make choices consistent with the law than they do in
the absence of such commitments. This is especially true of governments that
have recently removed restrictive policies that violated international law,
indicating a desire to reestablish a reputation for compliance. In short, rules
matter independently of a broad range of other influences on states' behavior.
This provides strong evidence that international law does much more than
8formalize policies that governments would have chosen in any case.
Legal institutions matter in this view because they focus expectations on
particular standards of behavior, and in so doing change the incentive
structures governments face to comply. In order to be able to play this role, it
is not necessary for the rules to be enforced in a highly centralized fashion.
Indeed, the evidence presented here is consistent with decentralized
"enforcement" on the part of civil society (domestic and international) that
can impose costs on governments who stray from their commitments. These
costs can be economic, as is the case when those who would engage in
international business transactions are deterred from investing or trading due
to the uncertainty of the government's commitment to protect property rights
and refrain from impeding the fulfillment of international contracts.
Governments that choose to violate their obligations are potentially also
subject to domestic political costs on the part of actors that view the
government's disregard of principled constraints as threatening or costly. The
impact of law on behavior, in this conception, does not rely on an Austinian
central enforcer. The chief candidate for such a role is the International
7. See generally Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, Strengthening Compliance with
International Environmental Accords: Preliminary Observations from a Collaborative Project, I
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 119 (1995).
S. See Downs et al., supra note 2; John Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International
Institutions, 19 INT'L SECURiTY 5 (1994-95).
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Monetary Fund (IMF),9 but as I argue below, the Fund has not been especially
active in enforcing the obligations of its members. Nor does compliance
depend heavily on enforcement in domestic courts, though the sheer volume
of the legal literature devoted to national court rulings contributes to the
opposite impression.10 Competitive market forces, rather than overt policy
pressure from the International Monetary Fund or the possibility of litigation,
is the most likely "enforcement" mechanism. International transactions
require confidence in the protection of property rights. The risk of deterring
international business is what gives international monetary law its
constraining influence.
These points are developed in four parts. The first broadly discusses the
literature on international law compliance and its relationship to international
relations. Scholarly work on compliance has burgeoned recently, with
important contributions from legal scholars as well as social scientists, and
sometimes as a result of collaborative work between the two. Yet, despite
growing attention, work on compliance continues to be plagued by serious
conceptual, methodological, and theoretical issues that make it difficult to
draw firm conclusions. Part II provides an overview of the substantive
monetary rules under consideration. While the end of the par value system of
9. One interpretation is that the Fund uses the threat of increased legal liability to enforce its
preferences against current account restrictions. See, e.g., Paul B. Stephens, Accountability and
International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents, andLegitimacy, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUs. 681, 719 (1996-97).
Stephens writes:
In effect the IMF staff uses its capacity to interpret the Articles as a means of expanding
their control over the budgets of debtor countries. Governments that share control over
their finances with staff obtain a valuable privilege that can be used to avoid liability in
other countries' courts. Those that prove recalcitrant face not only a denial of access to
IMF funds, but also an increased risk of legal liability outside of its borders.
Id. For an early and enthusiastic look at the enforcement capabilities of the IMF, see William M.
Reisman, The Role of Economic Agencies in the Enforcement of International Judgments and Awards,
19 INT'L ORG. 929, 934-47 (1965). Several authors have characterized the Fund's role as one of
ensuring compliance with these obligations contained in the IMF Articles of Agreement. See, e.g.,
Francois Gianviti, International Monetary Law, in 2 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING CENTRAL
BANKS 1, 6 (Robert Effros ed., 1994); see also infra note 10 (describing the IMP Articles of
Agreement).
10. The legal literature on the public international law of money has primarily dealt with
national courts' rulings with respect to the IMF Articles of Agreement, and specifically with article VIII,
section 2(b), which holds that "[e]xchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and
which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or imposed
consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member." Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 2 U.N.T.S 39, amended May 31, 1968,
726 U.N.T.S. 266, 20 U.S.T. 2775, amended Apr. 30, 1976,29 U.S.T. 2203, amended June 28, 1990, 31
I.L.M. 1307 [hereinafter IMF Agreement]. For works centrally concerned with this provision in
domestic courts, see generally CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING CENTRAL BANKS, supra note 9; 1
JOSEPH GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS 139-53 (1962); 2 JOSEPH GOLD, THE FUND
AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS (1982); Joseph Gold, The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States (Revised) and International Monetary Law, 22 INT'L LAW. 3 (1988); Gerhard Wegen, 2(b)
or Not 2(b): Fifty Years of Questions-The Practical Implications of Article VIII Section 2(b), 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 1931 (1994); and Stephen Zamora, Recognition of Foreign Exchange Controls in
International Creditors'Rights Cases: The State of the Art, 21 INT'L LAW. 1055 (1987). For a discussion
of the significance of domestic litigation and international arbitration involving article VIII, section 2(b),
see Werner F. Ebke, Article VIII, Section 2(b), International Monetary Cooperation, and the Courts, 23
INT'L LAW. 677, 677 (1989).
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exchange rates reduced IMF members' obligations with respect to their
conduct of international monetary affairs, they are still obligated by article
VIII, section 2(a) of the Articles of Agreement to keep their current account
free from restrictions and by article VIII, section 3 to avoid the use of multiple
exchange rate systems without the approval of the Fund. Part III discusses the
compliance issues surrounding article VIII. It begins by noting why
governments might, under some circumstances, want to implement restrictions
that breach their obligations, and then lays out a series of expectations
regarding the conditions under which governments might be expected to
violate their legal obligations. This part also presents data to address the three
central questions of this study: What explains legal commitment; who
complies; and what difference does a legal commitment make? Part IV
explores the findings, suggests interpretations, and draws conclusions. The
evidence suggests that legal commitments are crucial to policy choice. Taken
as a whole, it is most consistent with an interpretation that governments make
commitments to further their interests in international business and comply
with those commitments to preserve their reputation for predictable behavior
in the protection of property rights. Strong regional effects suggest that
reputations develop around regional standards of behavior. A positive
reputation for respecting the rule of law is associated with compliance,
suggesting that reputations are valuable and are not easily parsed into
international and domestic components. This implies that an international
breach may prove more costly to a polity that has invested heavily in a
reputation for respect for the rule of law generally. Despite the formal ability
of the IMF to enforce the rules, it is likely to be the market that provides the
broader enforcement context for the public international law of money.
Enforcement need not be overt and centralized to give behavioral rules their
bite.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW COMPLIANCE: A CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW
A. The Recent Literature
The recent enthusiasm surrounding the study of international law
compliance has been a long time coming. For decades, the study of the impact
of international law on state behavior had fallen through the interstices of
well-established disciplinary scholarship: the study of law and the study of
international relations."1 Legal scholars have traditionally viewed their task as
illuminating the rules of state international behavior, often leaving analysis of
the impact of these rules to the social scientist. Scholars of international
relations have long viewed explaining state behavior as their central concern.
11. See, e.g., Stephen M. Schwebel, The Compliance Process and the Future of International
Law, 75 AM. SOC'Y INT'L LAW PROC. 178-85 (1981); Stephen M. Schwebel, Commentary, in
COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 39, 39 (M.K. Bulterman & M. Kuijer eds.,
1996) (asserting that the judgments of international tribunals are largely complied with).
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International law, however, has not played a central role in their explanations.
No doubt this is largely due to the primacy of realism in the social scientific as
well as the policy community in the early years following the Second World
War. Early modem realists were responding to a world wracked by major
power confrontation. Their focus on questions of war and peace rested
centrally on the operation of the balance of power as a guarantor of world
stability. International law was viewed essentially as a flawed mechanism for
maintaining order in international affairs. In the words of Stanley Hoffnann,
legally sovereign states operated "in a tenuous net of breakable obligations."'
12
International law's fundamental weakness lay in its highly decentralized
nature. 13 Decentralized law creation, enforcement, and interpretation all
contributed to the view that international law could do little more than
"merely ratify the fate of arms and the arbitration of force."'14 Nor is
international law part of the international structure that, according to "neo-
realists," determines state behavior.15 The hegemony of realist thinking in
international relations has done much to discourage inquiries into the role that
international law might play in explaining international outcomes.
Increasingly, however, serious work is being done to examine the impact
of international legal obligations on the regulatory and foreign policy choices
of governments.16 One reason for this may be that the world has changed in
ways that realist conceptual lenses have been unable to bring into focus. The
long peace among the major powers, the tremendous growth in codified
international instruments over the course of the past few decades, and the rise
of economic and quality of life issues have drawn many scholars to examine
the role that rules and institutions play in regulating conduct among states.
17
12. Stanley Hoffmann, The Role of International Organizations: Limits and Possibilities, 10
INT'L ORO. 357, 364 (1956). Some legal practitioners are also skeptics. See, e.g., Francis A. Boyle, The
Irrelevance ofInternational Law, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 193 (1980); Robert H. Bork, The Lindits of
'International Law,' 18 NAT'L INTEREST 3 (1989-90).
13. See, e.g., HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER
AND PEACE (6th ed. 1985).
14. RAYMOND ARON, PEACE AND WAR: A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 109
(1981).
15. See, e.g., KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 79-101 (1979).
16. See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995) (proposing a theory for
managing compliance); ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998) (studying
compliance with environmental accords by various countries); ORAN YOUNG, COMPLIANCE AND PUBLIC
AUTHORITY (1979) (analyzing compliance with the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the
International North Pacific Fisheries Convention); Downs et al., supra note 2 (looking at treaty
compliance); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A
DualAgenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993).
17. Key volumes in the development of the study of international institutions include
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen Krasner ed., 1983); ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY:
COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); and ROBERT O. KEOHANE &
JOSEPH NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION (1977). Though these
works are centrally concerned with rules, norms, and institutions, they do not directly refer to
international law. However, a forthcoming special issue of INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Summer
2000), edited by Robert Keohane, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Miles Kahler, and Judith Goldstein, is the
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Most of the scholarly attention has focused on the "puzzle" of why states
cooperate with each other by creating international institutions-a question
that flowed naturally from the dominant paradigm that downplayed
institutions' importance.18
Voices speaking to the question of legal compliance were few and far
between in the 1970s and 1980s. Often these works were neglected by
scholars in both international law and international relations. Only recently
has compliance scholarship been rediscovered by a broader research
community. In international relations, for example, early quantitative work
suggested that much international behavior is consistent with international
law, even in the -conduct of hostilities between states. 19 While these findings
were provocative and important, few similar studies followed. More
conceptually, the early work of Oran Young brought public choice to the
question of international law compliance and highlighted the collective action
problems associated with rule compliance. Young proposed that we might
profitably think of an international legal system as a public good, in which
many polities may have an interest, but for which few are willing to pay the
costs. 2° In the legal field, the work of Roger Fisher began to explore the ways
in which law could channel politics toward legally condoned behaviors
(without simplistically asserting that law was a substitute for politics). 21 His
work drew lessons for international law by looking at the analogies posed by
domestic constitutionalism, which faces similar difficulties in enforcement.22
result of collaborative work between international relations and international legal scholars, and deals
explicitly with the rise of international law in ordering international life.
18. For an example of the debate between "realists" and "institutionalists," see Mearsheimer,
supra note 8, at 5; and Robert Keohane & Lisa Martin, The Promise ofInstitutionalist Theory, 20 INT'L
SECURITY 39 (1995).
19. See Charles W. Kegley & Gregory A. Raymond, International Legal Norms and the
Preservation of Peace 1820-1964: Some Evidence and Bivariate Relationships, 8 INT'L INTERACTIONS
171 (1981). This study derives norms from 244 authoritative legal treatises in effect between 1815 and
1974 in order to identify the kind of behavior legal authorities perceived as legally permissible at the
time they were writing. The study finds that "there is a substantial positive association between the
importance attributed to arbitration and the frequency with which major powers arbitrate their disputes."
Id. at 180; see also Charles W. Kegley Jr. & Gregory A. Raymond, Normative Constraints on the Use of
Force Short of War, 23 J. PEACE RES. 213 (1986) [hereinafter Kegley & Raymond, Normative
Constraints] (focusing on the period between 1815 and 1870); Herbert K. Tillema & John R. Van
Wingen, Law and Power in Military Intervention, 26 INT'L STUD. Q. 220 (1982). Kegley and Raymond
found that norm formation is stimulated by violence, but also that shared norms among the major
powers can contain violence, and that the most effective international rules permit but place limits on the
use of violence. See Kegley & Raymond, Normative Constraints, supra. Tillema and Van Wingen
looked at the role that law plays in military interventions, analyzing 70 military interventions involving
the United States, U.S.S.R., Britain, and France since 1946. See Tillema & Van Wingen, supra. Tillema
and Van Wingen's study addresses compliance with the U.N. Charter. "Compliance" is defined as a
strict interpretation of what the United Nations requires for an intervention to be legal. Tillema and Van
Wingen find that most interventions in the post-Word War II years have not been in accordance with
this strict definition, but that they have been in accordance with the standards that prevailed during the
more permissive interwar years. See id. at 226.
20. See YOUNG, supra note 16, at 26, 114.
21. See ROGER FISHER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (1981).
22. According to Fisher,
[i]n contrast to the individual criminal, a government is involved so deeply with law that
it will find it difficult, if not impossible, to adopt an antilaw posture. A government is a
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Intellectual momentum is now gathering to assess the impact of
international rules, institutions, and law on international outcomes.23 A cluster
of major studies in the last few years has helped to create a research and
policy community committed to the proposition that rules influence policy
choices of sovereign states. The most sustained research effort has been in the
area of international environmental accords, where major scholars have
conducted an impressive array of cross-national and cross-treaty research.24
For example, Harold Jacobson and Edith Brown Weiss have recently
compared the compliance performance of eight countries and the European
Union with respect to six environmental accords. 25 Their work concludes,
among other things, that administrative and technical capacities (including
knowledge and training, adequate authority and financial resources, and
access to relevant information) are crucial to compliance with international
environmental agreements.26 These arguments are less telling, however, where
governments are obligated to refrain from particular activities rather than to
implement complex technical accords.27 Nonetheless, the very scope of this
legal structure operating pursuant to legal powers, administering a system of laws. Its
power depends upon obedience to law by its subordinate officials and by the public at
large. It uses the adoption and enforcement of laws as the basic means of governing.
Id. at 17.
23. For general or collected studies of international law compliance, see, for example, id.;
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM (Dinah Shelton ed., forthcoming 2000); and CONNIE PECK, THE UNITED NATIONS AS A DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (1996) (emphasizing the legitimacy of the ICJ). See also Robert Keohane's
description of a research project on U.S. compliance with its international obligations in Compliance
with International Commitments: Politics Within a Framework of Law, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 176
(1992). See generally CONTROL OVER COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW (W.E. Butler ed., 1991)
(discussing public international law during the cold war); INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH
NONBINDING ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1997) (analyzing post-cold-war compliance with public
international law).
24. The work on international environmental law compliance is vast. See, e.g., JAMES
CAMERON ET AL., IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1996); THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS (Peter Sand ed., 1992); ENGAGING
COUNTRIES, supra note 16; THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE (David G. Victor et al. eds., 1998);
INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH: SOURCES OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
(Peter Haas et al. eds., 1993); ORAN YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE
ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY (1994); Jacobson & Weiss, supra note 7; Ronald B. Mitchell,
Compliance with International Treaties: Lessons From Intentional Oil Pollution, 37 ENVIRONMENT 10
(1995); Ronald B. Mitchell, Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance,
48 INT'L ORG. 425 (1994).
25. These eight countries are Brazil, Cameroon, China, Hungary, India, Japan, Russia, and
the United States. The treaties are the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer,
Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550; Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22,
1985, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293, 26 I.L.M. 1529; International Tropical Timber Agreement, Nov. 18, 1983,
U.N. Doc. TD/Timber/l l/Rev.1 (1984), available at <http:lsedac.ciesin.org/pidb/textsltropical.timber.
1983.html> (visited Apr. 22, 2000); Washington Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243; Convention on the
Prevention of Maritime Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T.
2403; and Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972,
1037 U.N.T.S. 151.
26. See Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, Assessing the Record and Designing
Strategies to Engage Countries, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 16, at 511.
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project has yielded a variety of insights, including the importance of
monitoring by the private sector in a democratic society and the importance of
"international momentum" in encouraging would-be laggard governments to
commit to and comply with environmental accords. If there is a weakness to a
study as sweeping as this one, it is that almost any hypothesis would receive
some support to some degree for some treaties in the case of some countries.
As a whole, the study is much more useful for stimulating further theorizing
than it is for eliminating possible explanations for the decisions governments
make.
International human rights is another substantive area in which a good
deal of research has recently been published on compliance. 28 Far more than
any other issue area, studies of compliance with international human rights
accords have been subject to thorny debates over what constitutes an
"objective" measure of compliance.29 More than other issue areas, the
literature here is largely descriptive and prescriptive rather than explanatory.
30
One tack has been to link human rights abuses with the "macro conditions"
that tend to give rise to those abuses.31 But without careful specification of an
argument linking the denial of human rights to such conditions, findings can
read like a jejune list of already widely held impressions. The abuse of civil
and political rights, for example, appears to correlate with the level of
economic development, equality, literacy, nonmilitary rule, and per capita
income.32 This tells us nothing, of course, about the conditions under which
governments facing such adverse circumstances nonetheless manage to avoid
27. For reviews of the compliance literature, see Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of
Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 345
(1998); Harold Kongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997);
S.V. Scott, Explaining Compliance with International Law-Broadening the Agenda for Enquiry, 30
AUSTL. J. POL. Sci. 288 (1995); and Beth A. Simmons, Compliance with International Agreements, 1
ANN. REV. POL. Sci. 75 (1998).
28. For research that looks at compliance with international human rights law, see, for
example, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: A
REPORT ON U.S. COMPLIANCE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
(1993); R.R. Churchill & J.R. Young, Compliance with the Judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights and Decisions of the Committee of Ministers: The Experience of the United Kingdom, 1975-87,
62 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 283 (1992); and James M. McCormick & Neil Mitchell,
Human Rights Violations, Umbrella Concepts, and Empirical Analysis, 49 WORLD POL. 510 (1997). For
research that focuses more narrowly on Soviet compliance with the family reunification and emigration
provisions of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and subsequent CSCE agreements, see Sandra L. Gubin,
Between Regimes and Realism-Transnational Agenda Setting: Soviet Compliance with CSCE Human
Rights Norms, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 278 (1995).
29. This problem closely parallels the broader debate over whether it is possible to reach
universal agreement on norms of civil, political, and social rights. See generally JACK DONNELLY,
UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1989).
30. This is completely appropriate, since the purpose of much of the research is to draw
attention to abuses and to call for better international monitoring and more resources to assure adequate
compliance. See, e.g., D.M. Stetson, Human Rights for Women-International Compliance with a
Feminist Standard, 15 WOMEN & POL. 71 (1995); Alicia Ely Yamin & Deborah P. Maine, Maternal
Mortality as a Human Rights Issue: Measuring Compliance with International Treaty Obligations, 21
HUM. RTs. Q. 563 (1999).
31. See MICHAELHAAS, IMPROVING HUMAN RIGHTS (1994).
32. See id.
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abuses, much less about the role that an international legal commitment might
play in policy and practice. Research that is potentially much more interesting
focuses on principled advocacy groups and the role they have played in
holding governments accountable to the international community for
violations of their own international legal commitments. 33 The findings of this
literature indicate that transnational actors, often operating through principled
advocacy groups linked to non-governmental organizations, have a significant
impact on norm observance in a number of cases.
Recent studies on international trade,
34 security and arms controls,35
European integration,36 and various adjudicatory bodies37 also indicate a
growing interest in the relationship between rules and governmental behavior.
Yet only rarely have these studies explicitly attempted to link outcomes
causally to legal commitments. As I shall argue below, doing so raises serious
conceptual and methodological issues that scholars have only begun to tackle.
B. Conceptualization, Measures, and Methods
The first conceptual challenge in the study of international law
compliance is to develop a defensible understanding of compliant behavior.
The approach taken here and elsewhere is to understand compliance as
behavior that conforms to treaty or customary rules. 38 In his groundbreaking
study on compliance with international public authority, Oran Young
33. See, e.g., MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998); Susan D. Burgerman, Mobilizing
Principles: The Role of Transnational Activists in Promoting Human Rights Principles, 20 HUM. RTS.
Q. 905 (1998).
34. In the area of international trade law compliance, see generally ADJUDICATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (EMst-Ulrich
Petersmann & Gunther Jaenicke eds., 1992); ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1993); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM (1989); JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND (1984); MIRIAN
KENE OMALU, NAFTA AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: COMPLIANCE WITH, IMPLEMENTATION,
AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS (1999); and Curtis Reitz,
Enforcement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 555 (1996).
35. On security and arms control, see COMPLIANCE AND THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL
(Gloria Dufly ed., 1988); GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: COOPERATION AND SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
(1994); LEONARD SPECTOR, NUCLEAR AMBITIONS (Janne Nolan ed., 1994); A.A. Angelova, Compelling
Compliance with International Regimes: China and the Missile Technology Control Regime, 38 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 419 (1999); and Gloria Duffy, Conditions That Affect Arms Control Compliance, in
US-SOVIET SECURITY COOPERATION (Alexander George et al. eds., 1988).
36. On compliance with directives of the European Union, see ANDRE NOLLKAEMPER,
GLOBAL COMPETITION AND EU ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
(EUI Working Paper RSC No. 98/4, 1998) available at <http://www.iuet.it/PUB/rscfm.html>; and
Peter M. Haas, Compliance with EUDirectives: Insights from International Relations and Comparative
Politics, 5 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 17 (1998).
37. On compliance with decisions of international adjudicatory bodies, see COMPLIANCE
WITH JUDGMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS, supra note 11; and 1 LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, INT'L CRIM. Cr. BRIEFING SER. No. 5, COMPLIANCE WITH ICC DECISIONS (1997).
38. See Jacobson & Weiss, supra note 7, at 123; David G. Victor et al., Introduction and
Overview, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE (David G. Victor et al. eds., 1998).
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suggested that compliance can be said to occur when the actual behavior of a
given subject conforms to prescribed behavior, and non-compliance or
violation occurs when actual behavior departs significantly from prescribed
behavior.39 This definition distinguishes compliance behavior from treaty
implementation, which is the adoption of domestic rules or regulations meant
to facilitate, but which themselves do not constitute, compliance with
international agreements. It also distinguishes compliance from effectiveness,
since it is entirely possible that a poorly designed agreement could achieve
high levels of compliance without much impact on the phenomenon of
concern (e.g., pollution levels). 40 While compliance may be necessary for
effectiveness, there is no reason to view it as sufficient.
Of course, even armed with a clear definition, it is very difficult to judge
whether a particular policy constitutes compliance at all. Often international
agreements are written so as to permit a range of interpretations regarding the
parties' obligations. Furthermore, compliance is rarely a transparent, binary
choice. Actors frequently will behave in ways that are intentionally
ambiguous, dilatory, or confusing, often under conditions in which
verification is difficult.41 In other contexts, actors may make good faith efforts
to comply that nonetheless fall a bit short of an agreement's prescribed
behavior. Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes have dealt with these
difficulties by making assessments of compliance in the context of generally
prevailing expectations.42
Some scholars deny that such efforts suffice. Indeed, some scholars
assert that one cannot determine compliance objectively at all, arguing that
standards of compliance are socially constructed. A judgment about behavior
must not be imposed by the analyst, making each compliance assessment, at
best, highly context-specific. 43 This concern is part of a broader critique of
social scientific methods that attribute meaning to actions, rather than
allowing these meanings to reveal themselves through intersubjective
discourse.44  Social constructivists-including John Ruggie, Friedrich
39. See YOUNG, supra note 16, at 2-6.
40. See Oran Young & Marc A. Levy, The Effectiveness of International Environmental
Regimes, in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES 1, 4 (Oran Young ed.,
1999); see also Kal Raustiala, Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation,
32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 2 (2000).
41. See YOUNG, supra note 16, at 59-62, 79-88 (discussing compliance with the Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty and with the International Pacific Fisheries Convention); see also Susan Subank,
Verifying Compliance with an Unmonitorable Climate Convention, 9 INT'L ENVTL. AFF. 147 (1997).
42. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 1.
43. This position is most consistent with theorists writing in a social constructivist vein. An
early influence on this approach was HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN
WORLD POLITICS 125-61 (1977). For a discussion of social constructivism's approach to international
law (though without explicit consideration of the problem of compliance), see ANTHONY CLARK AREND,
LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 124-48 (1999).
44. See Friedrich Kratochwil & John Gerard Ruggie, International Organization: A State of
the Art on an Art of the State, 40 INT'L ORG. 753, 768 (1986) ("The common practice of treating norms
as 'variables'-be they independent, dependent, intervening or otherwise--should be severely curtailed.
So too should be the preoccupation with the 'violation' of norms as the beginning, middle and end of the
compliance story.").
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Kratochwil, and Benedict Kingsbury-argue that it is difficult to infer the
meaning of compliance by focusing only on objectively observable patterns of
behavior.
45
These are important theoretical and conceptual considerations the
resolution of which is beyond the scope of this Article. The approach taken
here is that law is, indeed, a social phenomenon, but that it is possible to
examine the rational purposes behind law compliance or non-compliance. In
fact, the making of legal commitments is one way in which actors signal their
intentions to an international community of states, internationally active
economic agents, and domestic civil society. When actions are interpreted by
a multilateral institution, such as the International Monetary Fund, we have
some evidence of the socially understood meaning of that action. In effect, the
IM publishes yearly data from which it is relatively straightforward to infer
whether or not members have implemented policies that contravene their legal
obligations.
46
The methods I use to analyze this data systematically construct a
plausible story to explain why governments decide to commit their state to a
particular legal rule, why they do or do not comply, and whether this makes
any difference to state behavior. The last is important because countries that
are not legally obligated can and do act consistently with the rule. 47 Is legal
obligation causal or coincident to such behavior? By comparing similarly
situated countries-some that have made and some that have not made the
legal commitment under consideration here-it is possible to determine the
marginal effects that such a commitment makes to behavior. Furthermore, it is
essential to account for alternative explanations for behavior as much as
possible. I have included control variables in order to raise our confidence that
there is not some obvious explanation for behavior that a mono-causal
analysis would overlook.
Finally, it is possible to address one perennial issue that plagues research
on international law compliance: How do we know that rules do not simply
reflect rather than alter or influence governments' interests in pursuing a
particular course of action? International relations scholars deeply influenced
45. Benedict Kingsbury argues that
an approach to compliance that focuses only on objectively observable patterns of
behavior implicitly takes these patterns as proxies for internal attitudes and other relevant
normative effects. Such proxies may be adequate in some policy situations, but there is
frequently a risk that policy based on the circumscribed view of norms employed in
rationalist instrumentalist theories will be sub-optimal or dysfunctional.
Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of
International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 345, 356 (1998).
46. As Edwards notes, the tables at the end of each Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (which is the source for my compliance data) match the
Fund's definition of behavior on the part of an article VIII country that is on its face non-compliant:
"Except for the security reason exception, the definition [of restrictions given in the tables) is intended
to have the same meaning as 'restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current
international transactions' as used in Section 2(a) of Article VIII." RICHARD W. EDWARDS JR.,
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COLLABORATION 403 (1985).
47. See, e.g., Raustiala, supra note 40.
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by the realist tradition often view international agreements as formalizations
48of what governments were going to do anyway, and conclude that law adds
little to an understanding of interests. Of course, not even a legal idealist
would defend law as somehow contrary to states' interests, but the interesting
question is: Does law constrain under conditions when it is inconvenient to be
constrained? The best way to construct a case for law-influenced behavior is
to examine a long period of time that encompasses periods in which
compliance can be assumed to be quite difficult-in this study, periods of
balance of payments distress. The greater the temporal distance between these
distress periods and the prior decision to commit, the more likely they are to
represent unanticipated crisis situations. Unanticipated difficulties provide
strong tests of the independent power of an existing obligation to constrain.
Looking at yearly data on current account restrictions from 1967 to 1996
greatly improves the likelihood that commitment explains compliance, and not
the other way around. The following section specifies in much more detail the
nature of the obligations under examination and just what constitutes
"compliant" behavior with respect to the public international law of money.
II. THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MONEY: EXCHANGE
RESTRICTIONS AND MULTIPLE CURRENCY SYSTEMS
The Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund ("JMF
Agreement") is the first international agreement in history to obligate
signatories to particular standards of monetary conduct.49 This embodiment of
postwar agreements in monetary affairs significantly curtailed decentralized
decision making with respect to monetary affairs and created a legal and
institutional edifice that sharpened obligations, enhanced surveillance, and
centralized peer judgment on what constitutes appropriate international
monetary policy. Today,
[t]he international monetary system consists of a complex of relationships among
countries on matters affecting the adjustment or financing of the balance of payments that
are governed by rules and understandings that are more extensive than international
monetary law as a branch of public international law. Nevertheless, public international
law, principally in the treaty form, is now at the heart of the international monetary
system.
48. See Downs et al., supra note 2; Mearsheimer, supra note 8, at 5.
49. See IMF Agreement, supra note 10.
50. Gold, supra note 6, at 801-02; see also JOSEPH GOLD, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 5 (IM Pamphlet Series No. 32, 1980) [hereinafter GOLD, RULE OF
LAW]. According to Evensen and Oh, "When the International Monetary Fund was established, not only
was an international monetary system created, but also new legal obligations and new legal privileges
for its member states." Jane B. Evensen & Jai Keun Oh, Editor's Preface to JOSEPH GOLD, LEGAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: SELECTED ESSAYS, at xvii (1979).
Nonetheless, legal treatments of these obligations are surprisingly few. See ERIK DENTERS, LAW AND
POLICY OF IMF CONDITIONALITY 15-20 (1996).
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The IMF Agreement includes what can reasonably be interpreted as
"obligations of good conduct"51 created intentionally by member states to
foster a more liberal economic order.
52
Of course, members' obligations under the Fund Agreement were
significantly curtailed with the collapse of the par value system of fixed
exchange rates. 53 Yet important obligations remain. These are found in article
VIII, which is headed "General Obligations of Members." Article VIII,
sections 2 and 3 set out the obligations of currency convertibility.54 Section
2(a) proscribes members from making restrictions on payments and transfers
for current international transactions 55 without the approval of the Fund
itself.56 Current transactions include payment for goods, services, and
51. The phrase is Joseph Gold's. See JOSEPH GOLD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
AND PRIVATE BusiNEss TRANSACTIONS: SOME LEGAL EFFECTS OF THE ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT (1965).
52. According to article IV, section 1 of the Articles of Agreement:
the essential purpose of the international monetary system is to provide a framework that
facilitates the exchange of goods, services, and capital among countries, and that sustains
sound economic growth, and that a principal objective is the continuing development of
the orderly underlying conditions that are necessary for financial and economic stability
IMF Agreement, supra note 10. The original White Plan, which represented the American position when
negotiating the postwar monetary order, articulated the norm:
that there be accepted the general policy of foreign exchange trading in open, free and
legal markets, and the abandonment as rapidly as conditions permit of restrictions on
exchange controls, should be taken to mean that there shall be acceptance of the principle
that controls and restrictions will be employed only when they are clearly justified by the
economic circumstances, and only to the extent necessary to carry out a purpose
contributing to general prosperity.
3 J. KEITH HORSEFIELD, THE INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND, 1945-1965, at 64 (1969).
53. Under the original Articles of Agreement, in order to become a member of the Fund, a
country had to communicate a "par value" by direct or indirect reference to gold. This might involve
minor negotiations with the Fund, but basically established par values very close to those prevailing just
prior to membership. Members then had an obligation to maintain that par value within the margins
prescribed the Articles. See IMF Agreement, supra note 10, art. IV, § 10. Furthermore, article IV,
section 2 provided that "no member shall buy gold at a price above par value plus the prescribed margin,
or sell gold at a price below par value minus the prescribed margin." Id. art. 4, § 2 The Second
Amendment effectively ended the legal obligations relating to the par value system. See IMF
Agreement, supra note 10.
54. See generally Arthur Nussbaum, Exchange Control and the International Monetary
Fund, 59 YALE L.J 421 (1950).
55. The proscription is directed against only payments and transfers for current international
transactions. The IMF Agreement explicitly permits the regulation of international capital movements.
See IMF Agreement, supra note 10, art. VI, § 3. Current payments may also include payments of
moderate amounts for amortization of loans. See IMF Agreement, supra note 10, art. XXX(d)(3);
Gianviti, supra note 9, at 6.
56. See IMF Agreement, supra note 10, art. VIII, § 2. Member states are, however, permitted
to maintain or impose exchange restrictions under certain conditions:
" if they are necessary to regulate international capital movements, see art. VI, § 3;
" with the approval of the Fund, see art. VIII, § 2(a);
" if the Fund has declared a currency "scarce," see art. VII, § 3(b);
" if the exchange restrictions were effective at the time the state became a member
of the Fund, see art. XIV, § 2.
Furthermore,
members are not bound by the Articles to put the Fund's conclusions into effect, except
when the Fund concludes that a member is violating its obligations. Members are not
bound to obtain the Fund's approval of their exchange arrangements, the exchange
Money and the Law
"invisibles"--insurance charges, warehousing charges, shipping, business and
tourist travel, family remittances, royalties, dividends, interest, and other non-
capital transactions. s7 The guiding principle in determining whether a measure
is proscribed in this fashion is "whether it involves a direct governmental
limitation on the availability or use of exchange as such."58 Article VIII,
section 2(a) is meant to insure that currency restrictions do not frustrate the
completion of otherwise lawful transactions; it does not require that the
underlying transactions themselves be permitted. 9
Article VIII, section 2(a) appears to be the only part of the Bretton
Woods Agreements60 that is not limited to creating rights and obligations
between the governments of its member states, but which directly affects the
rights of each state's citizens.6 1 That is, section 2(a) imposes an internationally
mandated obligation on member countries toward their own residents. They
must permit their residents purchasing goods or services or making other
international transactions with non-residents to acquire and use the needed
currencies to make payments in settlement of those transactions. 62 In fact, the
IMF Executive Board has interpreted this obligation to mean that the
government must not delay, limit, or prevent any of its residents from
obtaining a foreign currency to settle a current international transaction.63 The
idea is that the payor should be able to obtain the currency needed in the
amount required for the current payments without delay. Furthermore, the
authorities are not to impose charges, such as taxes, on currency payments or
policies, or the exchange rates for their currencies, apart from the constraints of Article
VIII, Sections 2 and 3.
Gold, supra note 10, at 345 (emphasis added).
57. The Fund Agreement explicitly permits the regulation of international capital
movements. See IMF Agreement, supra note 10, art. V1, § 3. For a discussion of the distinction between
capital controls and current account restrictions, see JOZEF SwiDROwSKi, EXCHANGE AND TRADE
CONTROLS: PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS AND
SETTLEMENTS 43-50 (1975).
58. Executive Board Decision no. 1034 (60/27) June 1, 1960, para. 1, reprinted in 11
SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 259 (IMF:
Washington, D.C. 1986); see also 1 MARGARET GARRITSEN DE VIES & JOHN KEITH HORSEFIELD, THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 1945-1965, at 260 (1969).
59. For the distinction, see SWIDROWSKI, supra note 57, at 1; see also Gianviti, supra note 9,
at 7.
60. The "Bretton Woods Agreements" refers to agreements made at an international financial
conference held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in July 1944. See Michael D. Sandler, Section
Recommendation and Report, 30 INT'L LAW. 441, 444 (1996). These agreements, including the IMF
Agreement, created the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. See id.
61. See Klaus Boehlhoff & Axel Baumarms, Extra-Territorial Recognition of Exchange
Control Regulations-A German Viewpoint, in 6 THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE FINANCE 107, 108
(Norbert Homed., 1989).
62. See EDWARDS, supra note 46, at 391. Surrender requirements are not prohibited, because
surrender in itself is not considered to be an impediment to making of payments. Just because a
monetary authority requires residents to surrender foreign exchange does not necessarily mean that it
would not provide this foreign exchange when needed to conduct an international transaction. See Gold,
supra note 6, at 813.
63. See EDWARDS, supra note 46, at 391.
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transfers that have the effect of inhibiting or increasing the costs of
payments.
64
Multiple currency practices are prohibited in article VIII, section 3,
which provides: "No member shall engage in or permit any of its fiscal
agencies [e.g., the central bank, treasury, currency board, etc.]... to engage in
any discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency practices
except as authorized under this Agreement or approved by the Fund. '65 The
Fund in 1981 defined "multiple currency practices" as policies that have the
effect of producing rates of exchange that are independent of each other in
circumstances in which the market would not have produced this
independence. Basically, members are required to refrain from extensive
interference that leads to varying rates for different kinds of transactions or
different trade partners, unless the Executive Board approves.
67
None of these obligations are binding upon joining the Fund, however.
The IMF Articles of Agreement provided for a post-war transition period
during which members could avoid undertaking the full obligations of IMF
68membership. Upon joining the IMF, new members can avail themselves of
the transitional arrangements, which in effect "grandfather" restrictions that
were in place upon their accession to the Articles of Agreement. So-called
"article XIV status" reserves the right for members to maintain restrictions
that were in place when they joined the Fund, so an article XIV country does
not need approval to continue practices that are inconsistent with article VIII,
sections 2, 3, and 4. An article XIV country can also adapt its restrictions
without Fund approval. But an article XIV country cannot introduce new
restrictions, nor can it adapt multiple currency practices without Fund
approval. Countries that choose transitional status under article XIV are
expected to withdraw restrictions when they are no longer needed for balance
of payments reasons,69 and to consult annually with the Fund about the further
retention of restrictions inconsistent with article VIII.
In other words, currency convertibility is not and never has been a
requirement of Fund membership. 70 The Fund does try to persuade members
gradually to remove transitional restrictions-multiple exchange rates, foreign
exchange licensing systems-and then to adopt its traditional approach to
economic adjustment: Devalue if necessary, reduce domestic inflation, make
64. See id.
65. IMF Agreement, supra note 10, art. VIII, § 3.
66. For a discussion of several examples of multiple currency practices, see SWIDROWSKI,
supra note 57, at 71-84. For an in-depth examination of the case of China, see Chris Brown, China's
GA2TBid: Why All the Fuss over Currency Controls?, 3 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 57 (1994).
67. See JOSEPH GOLD, EXCHANGE RATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 266
(1988).
68. See IMF Agreement, supra note 10, art. XIV. For a discussion of the transitional period,
see Jeanne Asherman, The International Monetary Fund: A History of Compromise, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 235,259-63 (1984).
69. See IMF Agreement, supra note 10, art. XIV, § 2; see also 3 HORSEFIELD, supra note 52,
at 248-56.
70. This point is discussed by Buck Wile, Russian Membership in the IMF: A Look at the
Problems, Past and Present, 22 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 469, 471-78 (1992).
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comprehensive fiscal reforms, and simplify exchange restrictions to remove
their tax and subsidy effects. Once these fundamentals are in place the Fund
usually urges the article XIV country to remove its restrictions. Interestingly,
however, the articles contain no time limit for the transition period, nor any
criterion that mandates a formal shift to article VIII status.71
What can the IMF do to enforce the obligations contained in article
VIII? To the extent that the Fund has tried to influence members' policies, the
most common method is to use persuasion during the consultation process
rather than to apply a remedy for continued non-compliance. 72 Along with the
publication of data on states' policies from which one can largely infer
compliance, 73 this persuasion goes a long way toward a system of
monitoring. 74 The Executive Board has the power to approve a particular
arrangement, and this temporarily can bring an otherwise illegal restriction
into technical compliance with a member's obligations. Fund approval of a
country's restrictions may potentially have consequences in the domestic
courts of Fund members. According to article VIII, section 2(b): "Exchange
contracts which involve the currency of any member and which are contrary
to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or imposed
consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of
any member." 75 Unapproved restrictions, for example, cannot be used as a
71. See I DEVRIES & HORSEFIELD, supra note 58, at 225.
72. See GOLD, RULE OF LAW, supra note 50, at 185.
73. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS
AND RESTRICTIONS, analytical app.
74. Much of the compliance literature suggests that monitoring and verification can improve
compliance. See, e.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 16, at 180; WOLFGANG FISCHER, THE
VERIFICATION OF A GREENHOUSE GAS CONVENTION, VERIFICATION REPORT (1991); Jesse Ausubel and
David Victor, Verification of International EnvironmentalAgreements, 17 ANN. REv. ENERGY & ENv'T
1 (1992). Since the IMF collects data on restrictions for all countries for the entire time period examined
in this Article, this is a condition for which I have controlled rather than tested.
75. IMF Agreement, supra note 10, art. VIII, § 2(b). Some legal research suggests, however,
that there is a striking lack of uniformity in domestic courts' interpretations of article VIII, section 2(b).
See Pierre Francotte, Comment, in CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING CENTRAL BANKS, supra note 9,
at 14, 15-16; Allan T. Marks, Exchange Control Regulations Within the Meaning of the Bretton Woods
Agreement: A Comparison of Judicial Interpretation in the United States and Europe, 8 INT'L TAX &
Bus. LAW. 104 (1990); George B. Schwab, The Unenforceability of International Contracts Violating
Foreign Exchange Regulations: Article VilI, Section 2(b) of the International Monetary Fund
Agreement, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 967 (1985). For an example involving a decision of the New York Court
of Appeals, see Brian Trubitt, International Monetary Fund Conditionality and Options for Aggrieved
Fund Members, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 665, 669-70 (1987). For interpretations of article VIII,
section 2(b) by German courts, see generally Werner F. Ebke, Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the IMF
Articles of Agreement and International Capital Transfers: Perspectives from the German Supreme
Court, 28 INT'L LAW. 761 (1994). For a discussion of the arbitrability of article VIII, section 2(b) under
the law of the Federal Republic of Germany and U.S. arbitration law, see Otto Sandrock, Are Disputes
over the Application of Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the IMF Treaty Arbitrable?, 23 INT'L LAW. 933
(1989).
For a discussion of the relationship between article VIII, section 2(b) and letters of credit
(interpreted as "exchange contracts"), see David Kalson, The International Monetary Fund Agreement
and Letters of Credit: A Balancing of Purposes, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 1061 (1983). Article VIII, section
2(b) has been used unsuccessfully as a defense in the case of sovereign bond default in American courts.
See Philip J. Power, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market and Its Implications for Future
Restructurings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2701, 2724-26 (1996); Ettore A. Santucci, Sovereign Debt
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defense when non-performance of a contract is alleged.76 While the original
intent of this provision was to protect the ability of governments to maintain
approved restrictions, especially in an effort to defend their currency's par
value,77 it may also create disincentives to enter into exchange contracts with
private or public entities that operate under national rules that do not comply
with international obligations. However, in the absence of litigation, the
Executive Board's formal decision as to whether or not it has approved a
particular restriction is not made public. 79 It is not clear, therefore, how much
impact such decisions have on the decision to implement restrictions.
The Executive Board has other ways to sanction non-compliers, but, in
fact, the Fund has used these formal remedies very sparingly.80 The Board can
declare a member ineligible to use the resources of the Fund if the member
"fails to fulfill any of its obligations" under the Articles,8 1 and non-
compliance sometimes does interrupt drawings under stand-by and extended
Resolution Through the International Monetary Fund: An Alternative to the Allied Bank Decision, 14
DENY. J. OF INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1985).
For a discussion on the relationship between article VIII, section 2(b) and the imposition of
economic sanctions, see Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, The Battle for International Bank Accounts:
Restrictions on International Paymentsfor Political Ends and Article VIII ofthe Fund Agreement, 19
N.Y.U. 3. INT'L L. & POL. 981 (1987). Relatedly, a few cases handled by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
have touched upon the consistency of Iran's currency controls with article VIII. See John R. Crook,
Applicable Law in International Arbitration: The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Experience, 83 AM. J.
INT'LL. 278, 307-08 (1989).
76. According to Gold, "If a contract is unenforceable as a result of the provision, a court
may not decree performance of the contract or give damages for nonperformance. Unenforceability does
not mean invalidity or illegality. The provision establishes a defense rather than a condition for the
institution of proceedings." Joseph Gold, Article VIII Section 2(b) ofthe IMF Articles in its Institutional
Setting, in 6 THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE FINANCE, supra note 61, at 90. Furthermore:
The provision has displaced some principles of private international law. Contracts must
be treated as unenforceable even though the exchange control regulations that have been
neglected are not part of the law that governs the contract or its performance under the
private international law of the forum. Similarly, the provision applies even if the lex fori
governs the contract under the private international law of the forum. Courts must not
refuse to treat contracts as unenforceable on the ground that the exchange control
regulations that have not been observed are contrary to the public policy (ordrepublic) of
the forum or because the regulations are 'revenue' laws ... [P]rivate international law
will not apply if the lex fori imposes exchange control regulations as mandatory norms.
Id. at 92.
77. See DAM, supra note 6, at 98-101; see also Gold, supra note 76, at 73.
78. In practice, many domestic courts have been reluctant to refuse to enforce such contracts.
If an open international economy is construed as a public good, this must be juxtaposed with the
particular national interests courts may have in supporting the interests of the contracting parties, often
national firms or major financial institutions. See Gold, supra note 76, at 6-7 ("Not everyone deduces
from this argument that it is desirable to commit to the process by a broad application of Article VIII
section 2(b) whenever the opportunity occurs, particularly if private interests would suffer for the time
being").
79. Like most Board Decisions, however, decisions on approval of restrictions are generally
made available to the public through the IMF's archives after twenty years.
80. This is consistent with the domestic regulatory literature that emphasizes the importance
of coaxing and persuasion, and de-emphasizes the role of enforcement. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIvE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 35-40 (1992),
See generallyENFORCING REGULATION (Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas eds., 1984).
81. IMF Agreement, supra note 10, art. XXVI, § 2(a). Expulsion from the Fund, or
"compulsory withdrawal" are theoretical possibilities as well. Id.
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arrangements. 82 A member's voting rights may be suspended by a seventy
percent majority of the Fund's total weighted voting power, if the member had
previously been declared ineligible to use Fund resources and persists in its
failure to fulfill its obligations under the Articles of Agreement. 83 It is also
theoretically possible for a member that is consistently in breach of its
obligations to be expelled from the Fund,84 though this has never happened.
Realistically, however, non-compliers rarely have to worry about retaliation
directly from the Fund, since members that vote for some kind of punishment
may be concerned about drawing a retaliatory vote in the future. And unlike
the decentralized enforcement permitted in international trade, direct state-to-
state reciprocity is basically incompatible with the overall intent of the Fund's
articles.
8P
To summarize, after World War II, governments established for the first
time in history a public international law of money, which required adherents
to keep their current account free from restriction and to maintain unified
exchange rate systems. Put most simply, this means that if a bill for imports or
for an external interest payment comes due, national monetary authorities
should make foreign exchange available to pay it. They should also refrain
from adopting currency policies that cause the emergence or maintenance of
more than one exchange rate. This obligation is assumed voluntarily, but once
made the commitment is legally binding and permanent as long as a country
remains a Fund member. There are a number of mechanisms that are
theoretically available to enforce members' obligations, but sanctions have
rarely, if ever, been used. Why, then, do governments commit to and comply
with article VIII? The next part examines whether legal rules influence
economic policy choice even when governments facing unanticipated
82. According to Joseph Gold,
All standby arrangements include a uniform term on measures that directly or indirectly
affect exchange rates. Under this term a member is precluded from making purchases
under an arrangement if at any time during the period of the arrangement the member:
'i. imposes [or intensifies] restrictions on payments and transfers for current
international transactions, or
ii. introduces [or modifies] multiple currency practices, or
iii. concludes bilateral payments agreements which are inconsistent with
Article VIII, or imposes [or intensifies] import restrictions for balance of
payments reasons.'
JOSEPH GOLD, EXCHANGE RATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 466 (1988).
83. See IMF Agreement, supra note 10, art. XXVI, § 2(b); see also Richard W. Edwards Jr.,
Introductory Note, 31 I.L.M. 1307 (1992) (discussing the addition of this provision in the Third
Amendment to the IMF Agreement).
84. This is also known as "compulsory withdrawal." IMF Agreement, supra note 10, art.
XXVi, § 2(c).
85. According to Gianviti, "[t]he imposition of certain exchange restrictions by one member,
in violation of the Fund's Articles, would not justify the imposition of similar restrictions by other
members." Francois P. Gianviti, Developments at the International Monetary Fund, in 3 CURRENT
LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING CENTRAL BANKS 1, 12 (Robert C. Effros ed., 1995). There is only one
circumstance in which individual retaliation is authorized: when a member has put in place policies that
render its currency "scarce" as determined by the Fund. See GOLD, RULE OF LAW, supra note 50, at 163.
This is an exception that is strictly controlled by the articles and by the Fund.
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circumstances may find it inconvenient or even costly in the short run to
comply.
I. MARKETS AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY LAW: EXPECTATIONS
REGARDING COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE
Under what conditions should we expect governments to live
comfortably with their currency obligations, and when should we expect
tension between the rule and governments' behavior? In order to answer this
question it is important to understand not only the legal framework, but the
incentives governments have to break the law. This section reviews the
reasons governments might wish to place restrictions on foreign exchange
available to settle current account transactions. The analysis that follows relies
on "enforcement" mechanisms that flow from market rather than official
sources. In tension with a desire to retain their policy flexibility, governments
face market incentives to commit and comply with their article VIII
obligations. A credible commitment to maintain a current account free from
restriction provides information for investors and suppliers that a country will
be a reliable trade partner and a desirable investment venue. In the presence of
uncertainty regarding actual risk, economic agents will prefer to conduct
business with entities in jurisdictions that have pledged not to interfere with
current account payments or to discriminate with respect to exchange rates.8 6
The first expectation is that we should see policy convergence,
especially among countries that are "near substitutes" for one another.
Governments that lag significantly behind the policies of their more liberal
competitors place their businesses at a competitive disadvantage. On the other
hand, economic agents are likely to tolerate non-compliance if it is rampant
among similar states; deviant non-compliance is more likely to be punished
87than non-compliance that has become the norm. Thus, the decision to
liberalize the foreign exchange market will be strongly influenced by the
policies adopted by international competitors.
86. This perspective is consistent with a growing research program in political economy that
suggests that national economic policies and domestic institutions must be understood in the context of
the international market. Examples of this research program include GEOFFREY GARRETT, PARTISAN
POLITICS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (1998); SYLVIA MAXFIELD, GATEKEEPERS OF GROWTH: THE
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CENTRAL BANKING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1997); and
ANDREW C. SOBEL, STATE INSTITUTIONS, PRIVATE INCENTIVES, GLOBAL CAPITAL (1999).
87. Note that this argument is distinct from the claim that "normative concerns" underlie law
compliance. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990); Thomas
Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 1705 (1988). Indeed, most normative
theories emphasize that states comply with their obligations for reasons that do not have to do with the
incursion of direct costs and benefits. See, for example, the discussion of the socializing role of rules in
FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS (1989). The primary difference is that the
mechanism I propose here for imitative behavior does not require altruism, empathy, ideational
commitment, legitimacy, or esteem. See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm
Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887, 898 (1998). I expect compliance to be encouraged
through reputational mechanisms, burnished by international competition, with direct material
consequences.
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The second expectation is that a reputation for the rule of law should
correlate with compliance. One implication of viewing market pressures as the
primary enforcement mechanism for international monetary rules is that
governments should be very concerned to develop a reputation for openness
and, especially, predictability. Such a reputation is unlikely to be divisible:
Governments that have invested in and rest on a stable legal framework at
home are unlikely to jeopardize this reputation by lightly flouting international
legal obligations. In this way, compliance is influenced by a decentralized
system in which competition and concern for reputation motivate behavior.
This part explores three questions. First, what factors influence
governments to commit themselves to article VIII? Second, do countries that
commit actually comply? And third, what difference does commitment make
to actual behavior?
A. Why Commit to Article VII1? Explaining the Duration of the
"Transitional Regime"
In order to understand the decision to commit to and comply with article
VIII, it is essential to understand why governments may not wish to maintain
88an open current account. One reason may be to support developmental
objectives that favor certain kinds of transactions (exports, capital inflows)
over others (imports, capital outflows) based on established state priorities.
89
Another may be to affect the structure and operation of the banking system or
to distribute exchange controls operations to particular domestic banks. 90 The
primary reason, however, is likely to be to ameliorate balance of payments
problems. 91 Under these conditions, governments usually want to retain the
flexibility of intervening to conserve foreign exchange in whatever ways they
consider appropriate.
If the decentralized enforcement mechanism outlined above is correct,
then the decision to commit to article VIII should be strongly influenced by
markets that value certainty and policy liberalism. We therefore expect a
commitment to liberalization to be highly influenced by the choices of
economic competitors. Two variables are used here to test this hypothesis
empirically: first, the proportion of IMF members that have committed to
88. Current account restrictions are one example of economic controls that governments may
use to attempt to achieve certain policy objectives. For a discussion of general aspects of controls, see
SCHUSTER, supra note 6, at 27-37, 140-56; JOZEF SWIDROWSKI, EXCHANGE AND TRADE CONTROLS:
PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS AND SETLEMENTS 1-14
(1975).
89. See EDWARDS, supra note 46, at 386-87.
90. See generally SWIDROWSKI, supra note 90, at 61-69.
91. See EDWARDS, supra note 46, at 381-82. See generally GILBERT P. VERBIT,
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE RULE OF LAW PROBLEM 45-92
(1975). Verbit argues that "it is the perception of the balance of payments as 'negative' that normally
leads to the implementation of an exchange distribution system." VERBIT, supra, at 48. Verbit also
emphasizes that to many developing countries, exchange restrictions are preferable to currency
depreciation and can also generate revenue. See id. at 63-69, 74. On the balance-of-payments reason for
controls, see Gianviti, supra note 9, at 7.
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article VIII, and second, the proportion of jurisdictions within a given region
that has made such a commitment. The expectation is that, as this proportion
increases, so does the likelihood that any given country will also make such a
commitment.
A serious test of this proposition requires a battery of economic,
institutional, and domestic political controls that minimize the possibility that
any regional correlation is spurious. Control variables allow us to draw
inferences about the variables of primary theoretical concern, while taking
into account the possibility that other influences are driving the commitment
and compliance decisions as well. Their inclusion lessens the possibility of
wrongly attributing causation to the variables of greatest theoretical interest by
allowing for plausible alternative explanations. For example, we would
certainly expect balance of payments difficulties to influence the commitment
decision (primarily because they are likely to have a significant impact on a
government's ability to comply).92 But if economic conditions alone can
account for the pattern of commitment, or if they completely wash out the
effects of policy choices made in other countries, then we do not have a very
compelling story about competitive reputational concerns.
Economic conditions should certainly be included as control variables in
this analysis. We should expect countries with economies that are vulnerable
to highly volatile swings in their external position to find it difficult to
comply; similarly, susceptibility to balance of payments pressures is expected
to make a government less likely to accept article VIII obligations in the first
place. Developmental level and the direction of the business cycle could also
conceivably influence the decision to make a legal commitment with respect
to economic policy, since restrictions are a potential policy lever for
influencing imports and raising public revenues. The following analysis
therefore controls for reserves as a proportion of GDP, volatility in this
proportion, GDP per capita, and GDP growth.
It is also critical to consider the broader institutional context of the
commitment decision.93 Three controls relate to the IMF's potential role in
this regard. First, the Fund may have policy leverage through the distribution
of its resources. If the Fund applies leverage in order to persuade governments
to commit to liberalization, then the use of Fund credits should be associated
with a greater propensity to commit to article VIII.
Second, institutional changes ushered in by the Second Amendment
could be expected to affect the decision to commit to article VIII. Prior to that
92. Downs and Rocke argue persuasively that commitments are endogenous to expectations
about future compliance. See GEORGE DowNs & DAVID M. RocKE, OPTIMAL IMPERFECTION? DOMESTIC
UNCERTAINTY AND INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1995).
93. Many critics of highly analytical work note the fallacy of artificially separating a
particular rule from the broader institutional framework in which it is nested. "Precisely because rules
operate in broader networks, their isolation threatens to be artificial. Both within and across issue areas,
other rules and institutions can contribute to, or detract from, the effectiveness of any single rule." Andr6
Nollkaemper, On the Effectiveness of International Rules, 27 ACTA POLTICA 49, 63 (1992). Thus it is
important to control for the effects of other institutional arrangements that could be expected to impact
the commitment and compliance decision. See Kingsbury, supra note 27, at 363.
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time, governments willing to announce acceptance of article VIII obligations
could actually avoid multilateral surveillance.94 Article XIV countries, on the
other hand, were subject to wide-ranging, even invasive "consultations,"
during which the staff broadly reviewed, and the Executive Board passed
judgment on, the member's balance of payments position. Additionally, the
Second Amendment decoupled article VIII status from the determination as to
whether or not a currency was defined as convertible and therefore acceptable
for use in Fund operations. This change further lessened the institutionally
granted incentive to declare one's country to be bound by article VIII. 95 Other
things being equal, these institutional changes should be expected to render
the commitment rate much higher before 1977 than after.
Third, exchange rate regimes can be expected to have a systematic
impact on the decision to commit to article VIII. The degree of exchange rate
flexibility varies by country and over time. Flexible exchange rates absorb
some of the burden of balance of payments adjustment and mitigate the need
for large reserves to defend the currency. Since it then becomes much less
necessary to reserve the right to restrict in order to maintain a large pool of
reserves, flexibility should be associated with a higher propensity to commit.
Domestic political conditions are also a likely source of influence on the
decision to commit to article VII. 96 Most obviously, a government may
choose to commit to liberal policies because that is what the polity demands.
Article VIII provides a right of access to foreign exchange for residents and
non-residents, and such a guarantee is valuable to residents that engage in
foreign trade or depend economically on foreign imports or capital. For
importers, it provides a signal to foreign firms that the government is not
likely to interfere in the foreign exchange market or to intervene in
international business transactions. 97 Article VIII is also likely to be favored
by export groups, which recent research has shown to be concerned with
issues of reciprocity and retaliation. Hence, trade dependence shouldpositively influence the legal commitment to free and open foreign exchange
94. See IMF Agreement, supra note 10. Consultations with article VII countries were
established in 1960 but were completely voluntary. See I DE VRIES AND HORSEFIELD, supra note 58, at
246-47; Joseph Gold, Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Arrangements, 77 AM. J.
INT'L L. 443, 474-75 (1983). On the significance of the Second Amendment for mandatory surveillance,
see Harold James, The Historical Development of the Principle of Surveillance, 42 INT'L MONETARY
FUND STAFF PAPERS 762, 770-79 (1995).
95. See James M. Broughton, Silent Revolution: The Intemational Monetary Fund, 1979-
1989 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
96. See Edward D. Mansfield & Marc L. Busch, The Political Economy of Nontariff
Barriers: A Cross-National Analysis, 49 INT'L ORG. 723 (1995) (arguing that non-tariff barriers can
generally best be understood as the result of societal demands for protection); see also Kal Raustiala,
Domestic Politics and International Regulatory Cooperation, 49 WORLD POL. 482 (1997) (using a
variant of liberal theory to explain divergent approaches to international regulatory cooperation). See
generally Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,
51 INT'L ORG. 513 (1997).
97. See 1 DE VRIES & HORSEFIELD, supra note 58, at 285-86 ("Article VIII status had come
to signify over the years either that a country had a sound international balance ofpayments position or
that if its payments position was threatened, it would avoid the use of exchange restrictions.").
98. See MICHAEL GILLIGAN, EMPOwERING EXPORTERS 17-89 (1997).
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markets. Finally, one might expect that civil society's demand for guaranteed
foreign exchange access is most likely to be addressed by a democratic
regime. The political organization around this issue is likely to be that of
private interests versus the state, with concentrated rents going to the latter as
the dispenser of limited access to hard currency. If so, then democratic
governance should contribute to a higher rate of article VIII acceptance.
Before proceeding to more complicated analyses, it is useful to examine
trends in IMF membership and article VIII commitment for the period under
examination. As can be seen in Figure 1, both VIF membership and the
number of article VIII countries have grown over time.
FIGURE 1: GROwTH iN MEMBERSHIP OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND, 1967-1997








By 1995 a clear majority of members had given up their transitional
article XIV status and obligated themselves to openness.99 Many countries,
however, have taken a very long time to do so. What Figure 1 does not show
is that any given country has about a twenty-five percent chance of accepting
article VIII status in the first five years of IMF membership, a fifty percent
99. Data on whether or not the country has accepted article VIII status is taken from
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 73.
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chance within thirty-one years, and about a seventy-five percent chance after
having been a member for forty years.100 For many countries, the
"transitional" regime could in fact last a long period of time.
What factors affect the rate of country acceptance of obligations for
current account openness? Note that an article VIII obligation is a uni-
directional decision: Once the obligation is made it cannot be formally
rescinded if the country wishes to remain a member, although the country can
fail to comply with its commitment, as discussed below. I use techniques of
survival analysis that focus on the spell of time until the event of interest
occurs (in this case, the making of an article VIII commitment). Widely used
in epidemiological studies that seek to understand factors that affect mortality
rates, this technique can be used analogously to test for the conditions
associated with a greater "risk" of commitment (given that a commitment has
not yet been made up to this point).101 I am interested in demonstrating that
there are systematic influences on the rate of acceptance that can be
characterized as a desire to establish a credible reputation for economic
openness.
100. These rates of acceptance are estimated using the Kaplan-Meier estimator, in this case for
maintaining article XIV status beyond time t. The probability of maintaining article XIV status in any
given year is the product of the probability of maintaining this status in time t and the preceding periods:
I
S(t) = 17 [(nj - dj)Inj]
j=to
where n represents those cases which neither accepted article VIII status, nor were censored, and d
represents the number of acceptances during the time period. Subscript j designates the particular
country, and HI is a symbol for taking the product of the probability of maintaining article XIV status at
any given point in time (i.e., time t) and the preceding periods.
101. Specifically, I employ a Cox proportional hazard model to examine the effects of a
number of continuous and categorical predictors, and because some of these vary over time, the tests
presented here use time varying co-variates. The Cox model estimates a "hazard rate" which is defined
as:
h(t) = probability of accenting art. VIII between times t and t+1
(i+l) (probability of accepting art. VIII after time t)
The hazard rate is then modeled as a function of the baseline hazard (ho) at time t-which is simply the
hazard for an observation with all explanatory variables set to zero-as well as a number of explanatory
variables, the estimates of which indicate proportional changes relative to this baseline hazard. The null
hypothesis is that the proportionate hazard rate for any given explanatory variable of interest is I (it has
no effect on the baseline hazard rate).
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TABLE 1: INFLUENCES ON THE RATE OF ARTICLE VIII COMMITMENT
RESULTS OF A Cox PROPORTIONATE HAZARD MODEL WITH TIME
VARYING CO-VARIATES
Proportionate Effect on
Explanatory Variables the Commitment Rate Robust Standard Errors
(Hazard Ratio)
Universality 1.247*** .089
Regional Norm 1.038*** .010
Use of Fund Credits .577 .241
Flexible Exchange Rates 2.659** 1.286
Second Amendment .046 .053
Openness (Trade 1.019*** .004
Dependence)
Democracy 1.028 .034
Wealth (GNP/capita) 1.00009** .00004
GDP Growth 1.021 .041
Reserves/GDP .950 1.192
Reserve Volatility .883 .300
Number of Subjects: 106
Number of Commitments: 36
Time "at risk": 2177.96




** P> IZI = .05
***P>IZl = .01
Table 1 presents the findings of the Cox proportional hazard estimation
for the explanatory variables discussed above.' 2 Note that ratios of more than
one indicate an increase in the rate of article VIII acceptance, while ratios of
less than one indicate a reduction in the rate of acceptance. We are interested
in whether these ratios are significantly different from one, which represents
the basic acceptance rate.
The first two variables, "universality"'0 3 and "regional norm,''1°4 test the
proposition that taking on an obligation is likely to be related to similar
102. The dependent variable, commitment, is coded I if the country has accepted article VII
status, and is coded 0 if the country remains subject to article XIV transitional arrangements.
Acceptance indicates the end of a "spell" for purposes of the Cox proportional hazard model.
Statistical significance is defined as any result for which there is at least 90% confidence.
103. "Universality" is measured as the proportion of current IMF members, calculated yearly,
who have accepted article VIII status. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 73.
104. "Regional norm" is measured as the proportion of current IMF members within each
region who have accepted article VIII status. Classification of economies by region (East and Southern
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actions by others. Both of these variables have a large and positive influence
on the acceptance rate. According to these results, every one-percentage-point
increase in the proportion of IMF members accepting article VIII increases the
likelihood of acceptance by 24.7%. Similarly, a one-point increase in the
regional proportion of article VIII adherents increases a country's "risk" of
acceptance by 3.8%. This translates into a 45% increase for every 10%
increase in regional accession, which is calculated by raising the estimated
hazard ratio to the tenth power. Clearly, as the number of countries who
accept article VIII increases, there is a greatly increased chance that an
uncommitted government will do so. This impact is significant even if we
control for time (not statistically significant; not reported here), which reduces
the likelihood that the universality and regional norms variables evaluated
here are simply a reflection of the fact that adherents increase over time.
There is also evidence that institutional incentives have made some
difference in article VIII acceptance. "Second Amendment" (a dummy
variable that takes on a value of 0 prior to 1977 and 1 thereafter)10 5 has the
expected negative effect, though it is not statistically significant for this
sample of countries, many of which joined the IMF after surveillance was106 107
mandatory for all members. Flexible exchange rates 10 have probably
increased the likelihood of making an article VIII commitment, since it
becomes much less necessary with flexible rates to maintain large foreign
exchange reserves in order to defend a beleaguered currency. Perhaps the
most interesting of the institutional influences, however, is the fairly strong
and consistent negative effect of the use of fund credits108 on the article VIII
decision. This provides evidence that the IMF is not simply using resources as
leverage to pressure borrowers into making a legal commitment they are not
prepared to make. In fact, use of fund credits reduced the proportional hazard
rate by about 42.3%.19
Africa, West Africa, East Asia and Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Rest of Europe, Middle
East, North Africa, and Americas) are based on World Bank categories. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND, supra note 73.
105. This distinction is meant to capture the change in incentives that governments faced to
accept article VIII after the Second Amendment to IMF Agreement, especially the surveillance regime
and the convertibility regime for purposes of Fund transactions. See supra text accompanying notes 94-
95.
106. Research shows that for those countries that had joined the Fund by 1980, the change in
the surveillance regime had a very strong negative effect on the decision to commit to article VIII,
indicative of a rather perverse incentive to commit. Mandatory surveillance for all countries drastically
reduced the probability of accepting article VIII for those countries who were members during the
regime change. See Beth A. Simmons, The Legalization of International Monetary Affairs, 54 INT'L
ORG. (forthcoming 2000).
107. "Flexibility" is coded 1 if a country's exchange rate regime was flexible in a given year,
and 0 if it was relatively inflexible. See INTERNATIONALMONETARY FUND, supra note 73.
108. This variable is coded I ifa country had made use of IMF credits during a given year and
0 otherwise. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DATA 1995 (Retrieval of World Bank Indicators on CD Rom
using STARs Retrieval System 1995) [hereinafter STARs]; WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT
INDICATORS (1998).
109. This percentage is arrived at by subtracting the hazard ratio from unity. This substantive
interpretation seems consistent with the claims of the IMF staff:
[T]he acceptance of the obligations of Article VIII had been a matter for the member,
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Domestic political demands that flow from trade openness also appear to
have an important impact on the acceptance rate. Openness"0° to the
international trade system raises the proportional hazard rate significantly.
According to these results, every one-point increase in imports plus exports as
a proportion of GDP increases the likelihood of article VIII acceptance by
1.9%. This could account for a 72.6% difference in acceptance probability for
countries with trade profiles as different as, say, Malaysia (imports plus
exports approximately 80% of GDP for the spell under consideration) and the
Philippines (where the corresponding ratio is a little over 50%). 111 The
presence of a democratic regime, 112 on the other hand, had no independent
effect on the propensity to commit to openness.
Finally, with a few exceptions, the remaining economic controls
basically fit expectations: Making a commitment for external liberalization is
more likely under good and improving economic conditions. Wealth and GDP
growth make it more likely a government will commit, though in this model
the latter does not reach traditional standards of statistical significance. As
expected, reserve volatility (though not statistically significant) reduces the
rate of commitment.113 What is interesting, however, is the apparent strength
of the influence of external behavior on the commitment decision, even when
controlling for economic conditions to which governments obviously feel
pressures to respond. This seems to suggest that something like "peer
pressure" in a competitive market context, rather than either Fund pressure or
economic conditions alone, is in part driving the willingness of governments
to make a legal commitment to a liberal international monetary policy.
with the Executive Board approving the member's decision to change its status once it
had been shown to have no restrictions. The Executive Board had not taken a strong
position on the termination of transitional arrangements of Article XIV, either in general
or specific cases.
Broughton, supra note 95 (quoting minutes of EBM/87/39, Mar. 4, 1978, at 45). Gianviti notes that the
Fund may in fact have at times viewed current account restrictions as an alternative to fund assistance:
"The Fund is a cooperative institution designed to help its members, but its resources are made up of
taxpayers' money and are not unlimited: hence the desire to find other-even distasteful-remedies to
limit the amount of financial assistance from the Fund." Francois Gianviti, The Fund Agreement in the
Courts, in I CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES AFFECING CENTRAL BANKS 1, 8 (Robert C. Effros ed., 1992).
Broughton argues that it was not until 1993 that the Fund made major effort to persuade members to
accept obligations of article VIII. See Broughton, supra note 95.
110. Openness is defined as imports plus exports as a proportion of GDP. Imports are
comprised of total value of goods and services: the sum of merchandise f.o.b., imports of non-factor
services, and factor payments at market prices in current U.S. dollars. Exports consist of the total value
of goods and services: the sum of merchandise f.o.b, exports of non-factor services, and factor receipts
at market prices in current U.S. dollars. See STARs, supra note 108, indicators (210 + 119)/38.
111. The difference in acceptance probability is calculated in this case by raising the estimated
hazard ratio to the 29th power.
112. Domestic political regimes are scored according to how democratic they are, ranging
from a low of 0 (nondemocratic) to a high of 10 (highly democratic). See POLITY III Data set, ICPSR
Study No. 6695, available at <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu> (visited Apr. 14, 2000). For a complete
discussion of the conceptualization and coverage of this data set and comparisons with other measures
of democracy, see Keith Jaggers & Ted Robert Gurr, Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity
IData, 32 J. PEACE RES. 469 (1995).
113. Current account balance and volatility, as well as terms of trade volatility were also
analyzed, but because the results were insignificant they are not reported here.
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B. Why Comply with an Article VIII Commitment? Explaining the Decision
To Comply
Members of the IMF are legally required to comply with their
commitments to keep the current accounts free from restrictions and to
maintain unified exchange rates, and thirty-seven members have perfect
compliance records on both counts. 114 However, a number of article VIII
countries have a far from perfect record, as shown in Table 2. Most of the
long-term non-compliers are concentrated in Latin America, although there is
a marked trend toward liberalization in this region during the mid-to-late
1990s. The global financial crisis of 1997 elicited foreign exchange
restrictions in a number of article VIII countries that otherwise had exemplary
records of compliance (e.g., Singapore and Korea).
Why do some countries comply, while others do not? The strategy in
this section is to examine only cases in which governments have committed to
article VIII and then to explain the decision nevertheless to implement
restrictions on current account.115 The first and most obvious explanation for
non-compliance is once again economic pressures that make the maintenance
of an open current account and unified exchange rates very difficult. Certainly
economic conditions are likely to have influenced Latin American countries in
the 1980s and Asian countries in recent years. Thus, in the tests that follow, I
control for the current account balance,' 16 current account volatility, 17 and
reserves,118 all standardized over GDP.
114. As of 1997, Armenia, Bahrain, Canada, Denmark, Djibouti, Estonia, Finland, Gambia,
Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Kiribati, the Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Malaysia, the Marshall
Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Portugal, Qatar, Russia, San
Marino, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, the
United Arab Emirates, the United States, Vanuatu, and the Yemen Arab Republic all had perfect records
of compliance with their article VIII status. However, there are very few yearly observations on several
of these cases. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 73.
115. Restrictions on current account are coded 1; absence of restrictions is coded 0. Since this
section analyzes only the policies of article VIII countries, restrictions are interpreted as non-
compliance. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 73. At this point I do not examine the
technical question of whether the Executive Board of the IMF has approved of the restrictions in place,
thus rendering them "legal" temporarily.
116. The current account balance is defined as the sum of net exports of goods and non-factor
services, net factor income, and net private transfers as a percentage of GDP, before official transfers, as
a proportion of GDP for each country for the period under observation. See STARs, supra note 108,
indicators 223/38.
117. Current account volatility is defined as the log of the standard deviation of current
account balance as a proportion of GDP. See STARs, supra note 108, indicators 223/38.
118. Reserves are defined as central monetary authority reserves, including official holdings of
gold valued at London market prices, SDR holdings, reserve position at the IMF, in current U.S. dollars.
Reserves are standardized as a proportion of GDP. See STARs database, supra note 108, indicators
397/38.
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TABLE 2: NON-COMPLIERS*: RATES AND YEARS OF NON-COMPLIANCE:
RESTRICTIONS 1967-1997
Country Rate of non- Years Dates of restrictions
compliance committed:
(1967-1997) (1967-1997)
Dominican Republic 1.00 31 1967-1997
El Salvador .87 31 1967-1993
Jamaica .81 31 1968-1969, 1973-1995
_ _Guyana .77 31 1967, 1971-1993
_Chile .75 20 1983-1995, 1996-1997
South Africa .71 24 1979-1993, 1996-1997
Cyprus .71 7 1991-1993, 1996-1997
Iceland .64 14 1984-1992
Morocco .60 5 1993, 1996-1997
Argentina .59 29 1972-1977, 1983-1993
Costa Rica .55 31 1972-73, 1975, 1982-95
Peru .55 31 1971-78, 1985-92, 1996
St. Lucia .53 15 1981-1986, 1996-1997
Guatemala .52 31 1967-1973, 1981-1989
St. Vincent .50 14 1982-1986, 1996-1997
Barbados .50 4 1996-1997
Israel .50 4 1996-1997
Nicaragua .48 31 1979-1993
Ecuador .41 27 1983-1993
Greece .40 5 1996-1997
Tunisia .40 5 1996-1997
Honduras .39 31 1982-1993
Fiji .28 25 1989-1992, 1996-1997
Italy .26 31 1975-1982
Swaziland .25 8 1996-1997
Turkey .25 8 1996-1997
Grenada .25 4 1997
Austria .23 31 1967-1973
Bolivia .23 30 1982-1986, 1996-1997
Korea .22 9 1996-1997
Belize .21 14 1982,1996-1997
St. Kitts & Nevis .18 11 1996-1997
Mexico .16 31 1983-1987
Antigua & Barbuda .14 14 1996-1997
France .13 31 1969-1971, 1983
Haiti .13 31 1968-1971
Dominica !.1I1 18 1996-1997
Japan .10 30 1968-1970
Oman 1.09 23 11996-1997
Papua New Guinea 1.09 122 11996-1997
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Bahamas .08 24 1996-1997
Netherlands Antilles .06 31 1996-1997
Solomon Islands .06 18 1997
Singapore .05 21 1997
*Non-compliers with three or fewer years of article VIII commitment (1995-1997):
Algeria, Bangladesh, Benin, Botswana, Burkina-Faso, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Chad, China, Comoro, Congo, Croatia, Czechoslovakia, Gabon, Georgia,
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, India, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Moldova, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Pakistan, Paraguay,
Philippines, Poland, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sri Lanka,
Tanzania, Togo, Tonga, Ukraine, Western Samoa, and Zimbabwe
The central concern of the analysis, however, is the pressure that the
behavior of other similarly situated countries places on the decision to
comply. Investors and suppliers seeking opportunities for international
commerce, would prefer to do business with firms in countries with a legal
framework that provides greater certainty that international contracts will not
be fulfilled arbitrarily or discriminatorily. "Regional non-compliance"
119
reflects the extent to which other countries within each region have
implemented restrictions on their current accounts, as shown in Table 3. The
expectation is that if it is common for article VIII countries in the region to
disregard their commitments to keep their current accounts free from
restrictions, this should increase the probability that any given country in that
region will decide against compliance. On the other hand, the more
competitors are willing to comply, the greater the pressure for any one country
to comply, even in the face of economic pressure to protect the national
economy through restrictions or multiple exchange rates.
Institutional context may also be important for the compliance question.
First, if the RMF is "enforcing" liberal legal obligations through the
conditional distribution of resources, then we would expect the use of these
credits to be associated with compliance. Second, compliance may be more
palatable if it is not essential to maintain reserves in order to defend a fixed
value of the currency. Flexible rates should be associated with greater
compliance.
Finally, it is important to consider characteristics of the domestic polity
itself. Several authors have implied that compliance with international legal
commitments is much more prevalent among liberal democracies, pointing to
the constraining influence exercised by domestic groups who may have
interests in or a preference for compliant behavior.120 In this view,
119. Regional non-compliance is defined as the proportion, calculated yearly, of current IMF
members within each region who place restrictions on their current accounts. World Bank regional
classifications are used. See supra note 104. Since this explanatory variable is used only to analyze
policies of article VIII countries, it is interpreted as non-compliance. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND, supra note 73.
120. See the discussion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty and Fisheries agreements in ORAN
YoUNG, supra note 16, at 51-66 (1979); and OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 7 (1991). See generally Moravcsik, supra note 96. Edith Brown Weiss has commented that
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participatory politics might put pressure on the government to comply,
especially in this case where non-compliance involves curtailing the rights of
residents to foreign exchange. Others have argued that the most important
characteristic of liberal democracy when it comes to international compliance
is a strong domestic commitment to the rule of law. There are many variants
of the argument-from Anne-Marie Slaughter's view that independent
judiciaries in liberal democracies seem to share some of the same substantive
approaches to law 12 to a more general argument that domestic systems that
value rule-based decision-making and dispute resolution are also likely to
respect rules internationally. 122 In essence, these are affinity arguments: They
argue that domestic norms regarding limited government, respect for judicial
processes, and regard for constitutional constraints "carry over" into the realm
of international politics. 123 They rest on an intuitively appealing assumption
that policymakers and lawmakers are not able to park their normative
perspectives at the water's edge.
1 24
"the more adherence to democratic norms, the more [we might expect] implementation and
compliance." Edith Brown Weiss, Remarks, 89 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 206, 211 (1995). She
recognizes, however, that there are some cases under which democratic institutions could undermine
compliance. See id. For an examination of the impact of domestic appeals to implement international
norms, see Andrew P. Cortell & James W. Davis, Jr., How Do International Institutions Matter? The
Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms, 40 INT'L STUD. Q. 451 (1996).
121. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World ofLiberal State, 6 EUR. J. INT'L
L 503 (1995).
122. This captures the flavor of some of the democratic peace literature that has flourished in
political science. See, e.g., William I. Dixon, Democracy and the Management of International Conflict,
37 J. CONFLICT RES. 42 (1993); Michael W. Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics, 80 AM. POL, SCI.
REv. 1151 (1986); Gregory A. Raymond, Democracies, Disputes, and Third-Party Intermediaries, 38 J.
CONFLICT REs. 24 (1994). Liberal states may agree to and comply with decisions by international
tribunals more readily than illiberal states. See generally Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997) (applying liberal
theory); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and International Adjudication: How To
Constitutionalize the UN Dispute Settlement System, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 4 (1999); Ernst
Ulrich Petersmann, How To Constitutionalize International Law and Foreign Policy for the Benefit of
Civil Society, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (1999); Anne-Made Slaughter & Alec Stone, Assessing the
Effectiveness of International Adjudication, 89 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 91 (1995); Fernando R.
Teson, The Kantian Theory ofinternationalLaw, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53 (1992).
123. "International law is not unlike constitutional law in that it imposes legal obligations
upon a government that in theory the government is not free to ignore or change." FISHER, supra note
21, at 30. Constitutional constraints most often rest on their shared normative acceptance, rather than on
the certainty of their physical enforcement, providing another possible parallel to the international
setting. The proposition that constitutionally constrained governments are more likely to observe legal
obligations seems to dovetail with that strand of the democratic peace literature that argues that regard
for domestic constitutional constraints carries over into the conduct of foreign policy. See generally
THOMAS RISSE-KAPPEN, COOPERATION AMONG DEMOCRACIES: THE EUROPEAN INFLUENCE ON U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY (1995); Dixon, supra note 122.
124. Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan argue, for example, that states "willing to submit
to the rule of law and civil society are more likely to submit to their analogues internationally." Charles
Kupchan & Clifford Kupehan, Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe, 16 INT'L
SECURITY 114, 115-16 (1991). Volker Rittberger and Frank Schimmelfennig also test an "idealistic-
liberal expectation" that "due to societally anchored norms operating as constraints on foreign policy
behavior, the growth of German power will not be followed by a foreign policy change which is
characterized by an increased projection or use of power." VOLKER RITTBERGER & FRANK
SCHIMMELFENNIG, GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER UNIFICATION: A RE-EXAMINATION OF REALIST
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There are other reasons, however, to expect the rule of law to be
associated with article VIII compliance. Rule of law countries have a strong
positive reputation for maintaining a stable framework for property rights.
Markets expect them to maintain their commitments, and to undermine this
expectation would prove costly. Countries that score low with respect to the
rule of law do not have much to lose by non-compliance; erratic behavior is
hardly surprising to investors and traders. I use an indicator for the rule of law
that is especially appropriate to test the market's assessment of the reputation
for rule of law: a six-point scale published by a political risk analysis firm
expressly to assess the security of investments. 125 The scale represents the
willingness of citizens to implement law and adjudicate disputes peacefully
using established institutions. Higher scores on this six-point measure indicate
the presence of such institutional characteristics as a strong court system,
sound political institutions, and provisions for orderly succession. Low scores
reflect an increased use of extra-legal activities in response to conflict and to
settle disputes.
Since I have argued that compliance is market enforced, and that
markets prefer certainty in the legal framework, the comparison between the
participatory characteristics of democracy and rule of law regimes should be
especially telling. There is no reason to expect that democracy alone provides
the stability that economic agents desire. On the contrary, popular
participation along with weak guarantees for fair enforcement of property
rights can endanger these rights. It is true that these two variables are
positively correlated, but they are certainly conceptually distinct, and may
have very different impacts on the decision to comply with article VIII
obligations. Thus, we are able to directly compare two regime characteristics
that are often conflated: democracy with its participatory dimensions on the
one hand, and the rule of law with its emphasis on procedural certainty on the
other. A control for bureaucratic quality' 26 is also included to control for the
differential capacity of various states to intervene in foreign exchange
markets.
In this case the compliance decision is modeled using a logistical
regression (logit) model, with the dependent variable taking on a value of 1
for the presence of restrictions and 0 for their absence. (Since we are
analyzing only article VIII countries, each restriction is also a case of apparent
non-compliance.) Because the data consist of observations across countries
and over time, with a strong probability of temporal dependence among
PROGNOSES 16-17 (Tubiner Arbeitspapiere zur internationalen Politik und Friedensforsehung Number
28a, 1997). See generally RISSE-KAPPEN, supra note 123.
125. Rule of Law is measured along a one-to-six point scale measuring the extent to which a
country's domestic polity is based on practices that respect the rule of law. Data collected by Country
Risk Guide (on file with author). For a full discussion of the conceptualization of this variable, see
Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using
Alternative Institutional Measures, 7 ECON. & POL. 207, 225 (1995).
126. Bureaucratic quality is measured by a one-to-six scale measuring the extent to which a
country's bureaucracy is capable of carrying out a range of administrative tasks. For a full discussion of
the conceptualization of this variable, see Knack & Keefer, supra note 125.
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observations, a logit specification is used that takes explicit account of the
non-independence of observations. 127 The results are reported in Table 3.
TABLE 3: INFLUENCES ON THE DECISION To COMPLY WITH
ARTICLE VIII OBLIGATIONS
Dependent Variable: Current Account Restrictions
Range of Analysis: Article VIII Countries Only, 1982-1995
Results of a Logit Model with Correction for Time Dependence of Observations
Explanatory Variables Logit Coefficients RobustStandard Errors
Constant -2.84*** .784
Regional Non-Compliance 5.94*** .982
Rule of Law -.288** .135
Bureaucratic Quality .417*** .146
Democratic Regime .003 .008
Use of Fund Credits .723* .386
Average Balance of -.083** .034
Payments/GDP
Current Account Volatility .400* .242
Average Reserves/GDP -2.71 2.09
Number of observations: 620
Probability > e 0.00
Log Likelihood: -139.35




One of the most important findings is again the clustering of compliance
behavior across regions. Article VIII countries are much more likely to put
illegal restrictions on current accounts if other countries in the region are
doing so. Could this be due to common economic pressures sweeping the
region? This explanation cannot be completely ruled out, but it is rendered
less likely by the range of economic variables that were included in the
specification. The inclusion of various measures of reserves, current account,
wealth, and growth failed to wash out apparent regional mimicry. Compliance
decisions are apparently not being made on the basis of economic conditions
alone, but with an eye to standards of regional behavior. The most obvious
127. I use a method described fully in Nathaniel Beck et al., Taking Time Seriously: Time-
Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable, 42 AM. J. POL. SCh 1260 (1998). A
counter-vector was created and three splines were included in the analysis, but their coefficients are not
reported here.
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reason for this concern would be reputational consequences in a competitive
international economic environment.
The domestic political variables tell an interesting story with respect to
regime characteristics. The evidence is strong that states must have the
developmental capacity to renege on their commitments. The strong positive
relationship between bureaucratic quality and restrictions implies that these
choices are more likely to be made where the capacity exists to implement
them. Trade dependence may have an influence on restrictions, but the
standard errors raise some doubts. By contrast to theories of international
behavior that concentrate on the law-consciousness of democracies, the
evidence presented here suggests that the quality of being democratic actually
contributes little or nothing when other factors are held constant.128 On the
other hand, a strong domestic commitment to the rule of law contributes
positively to compliance.
When the IMF is the enforcer of compliance, we should see a strong
negative effect on the dependent variable. Yet the coefficient is positive and
statistically significant. The Fund is tolerating a good deal of non-compliance
when it comes to restricting access to foreign exchange, 129 a finding that is
inconsistent with the effective use of its leverage.
C. To Commit or Not To Commit: What Is the Difference?
This final section of analysis considers whether the law matters:
Specifically, does making an article VIII commitment have an independent
effect on behavior, once we take into account the obvious economic factors
that are likely to lead to restrictions on current accounts? Certainly, those who
have labored long and hard in the study and practice of international law are
apt to emphasize the uniquely constraining qualities of legal institutions on
governmental decision making. Louis Henkin, for example, has argued that
"there is an influence for law observance in the very quality of law, in the
sense of obligation which it implies." 130 Is there something about making a
legal commitment that enhances the prospects of behavior required by the
rule?
In order to answer this question, I analyze the entire data set (133
countries, including article VIII and article XIV cases, with observations over
time averaging twenty years) using logit analysis to explain the existence of
restrictions.13 1 Article VIII status is forced to compete with a broad range of
economic conditions that one would clearly expect to be associated with
128. On a subset of countries that were IMF members by 1980, earlier research has shown a
strong negative correlation between democracy and compliance with respect to restrictions on current
accounts. See Simmons, supra note 106.
129. This result is completely consistent with archival research, which has uncovered evidence
that stand-by arrangements are often accompanied by the temporary approval of restrictions in order to
conserve foreign exchange. See EDWARDS, supra note 46, at 413.
130. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 60.
131. I used the same technique for time-dependence of observations as that described supra
note 127.
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restrictions: volatility in the terms of trade, 132 reserves, 133 and the balance of
payments;134 economic growth rates;1 35 and per capita GNP.
TABLE 4: DOES ARTICLE VIII MATTER?
Results of a Time Series Cross Section Logit Model
Dependent Variable: Restrictions on Current Account
Explanatory Variables Logit Robust Standard Errors
Coefficients
Constant .845** .355
Article VIII Commitment -1.151*** .141
Terms of Trade Volatility .405*** .100
Balance of Payments/GDP -.021** .010
GNP/Capita -.00001 .00002
Reserves/GDP 1.99*** .551
Change in GDP -.031*** .012
Openness -.005** .002
Use of Fund Credits .821*** .138
Flexible Exchange Rates .160 .158
Years Since Last Restriction -1.30*** .114
Number of observations: 2973




•* P>IZI = .05
***P> IZI = .01
Table 4 presents the results of this analysis. Most of the economic
variables do indeed have the expected effects, and many are in fact significant.
The strongest effects are, as expected, those associated with balance of
payments difficulties and low and/or volatile reserves. Income per capita and
GDP growth also contribute to an economic explanation of a liberal policy
orientation with respect to restrictions. As seen in the earlier analysis,
openness is also associated with liberal policy choice. Another interesting
132. Terms of Trade Volatility is measured as the log of the standard deviation of the terms of
trade index. The terms of trade index is the relative level of export prices compared with import prices,
calculated as the ratio of a country's index of average export price to the average import price
(1987=100). See STARs, supra note 108, indicator 275.
133. Reserve volatility is measured as the log of the standard deviation of reserves/GDP for
each country over the observed time period. Thus, this measure varies by country, not over time. See id.,
indicator 397.
134. See id., indicator 397. Balance of payments is a yearly observation of the ratio of the
current account balance as a proportion of GDP. Volatility measures the extent of variation over time.
135. Economic growth rates are measured as GDP average annual growth rate, at factor cost
plus indirect taxes, less subsidies. See id., indicator 181.
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finding is that use of fund credits is consistently associated with illiberal
policy choice, once again providing evidence that these choices cannot
convincingly be explained by Fund pressure in the context of extending loans.
Most important for our purposes, however, is that, controlling for the
likely macroeconomic influences on the decision to implement current
account restrictions, having made a formal declaration of adherence to article
VIII obligations consistently has a strong negative effect on the probability of
imposing restrictions. In fact, controlling for all other economic variables as
well as for policy inertia, 136 countries that continue to live under the
"transitional" article XIV regime have an estimated probability of .55 of
implementing restrictions, while the corresponding probability for an
identically situated article VIII country is only .46. 137 Thus, commitment
accounts for just about a nine-percentage-point difference in the probability of
imposing restrictions on current accounts for the sample of cases as a whole.
These findings provide fairly strong evidence that legal commitments
have a systematic effect on state behavior. It should be underscored that the
legal commitment was shown to affect the propensity to restrict the current
account, controlling for a wide range of economic conditions and the time
dependence of observations (policy inertia). It is difficult to counter that these
results merely reflect the actions that governments had intended to take
regardless of a formal commitment. Recall that adherence to article VIII is a
one-way commitment, and that in a thirty- to fifty-year time span after making
such a commitment there are certainly likely to be unanticipated occasions in
which eschewing restrictions on current accounts is an inconvenient
commitment to have made. Nonetheless, in a significant number of these
cases, governments appear to have decided that their best interests lay in
sticking with their commitment to refrain from implementing restrictive
policies.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The effect of international law on states' behavior should be a central
concern of international relations scholarship, but few studies have
systematically examined this question. International legal scholars tend to
view law compliance as the norm,138 while political scientists are far more
skeptical. 139 In the face of daunting conceptual and methodological issues,
140
very little systematic evidence has accumulated to assess basic propositions
about why governments commit to and comply with international legal
136. Here I report the predicted probabilities as generated by a set of simulation algorithms
developed by Gary King et al., Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and
Presentation, 44 AM. J. POL. Si. 341 (2000).
137. This is the result of holding all other variables at their mean and calculating the
probability from the raw logit coefficients in Table 4.
138. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 1; Chayes & Chayes, supra note 1.
139. See, e.g., Downs et al., supra note 2; Mearsheimer, supra note 8.
140. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 27, at 91.
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obligations and whether this makes any difference to outcomes in which we
are interested.
The legalization of some central aspects of the international monetary
regime after World War II provides an opportunity to inquire into the
conditions under which law can influence the behavior of governments in the
choice of their international monetary policies. Using the IMF's own data to
examine this issue, we can be fairly precise about what constitutes obligation
and compliance. The strategy of this Article has been to model the factors that
contribute to the rate of article VIII acceptance, to test a set of hypotheses
regarding compliance with this commitment, and finally, to assess the impact
that commitment has on behavior.
One of the most interesting findings is that the behavior of other
countries, especially in one's own region, has far more impact on commitment
and compliance decisions than has generally been recognized. Indeed, there
was more evidence of competitive policy convergence than of overt pressure
from the Fund on borrowing countries. Especially compelling is the finding
that governments are positively influenced by the choices of other
governments in their own region. They are more likely both to make and to
honor a legal commitment if others in the region are doing so. This provides
evidence that norms are set and reputations are assessed among groups of
roughly comparable countries, likely through international market channels
rather than international organizational channels. Although the Fund
undoubtedly has a significant impact on some countries at certain points in
time, much more decentralized forces seem largely to be at play.
Among article VIII countries, two regime effects had clear consequences
for compliance. Surprisingly for those who view the international behavior of
democracies as somehow distinctive with respect to law and obligation,
participatory democracy had little to do with the compliance question. On the
other hand, regimes that were based on clear principles of the rule of law were
far more likely to comply with their commitments. This indicates that rules
and popular pressures can, and apparently sometimes do, pull in opposite
directions when it comes to international law compliance. It seems clear that
governments that provide for a stable framework of law and system of
property rights domestically are more likely to do the same for the purposes of
facilitating international economic transactions. One interpretation is that a
credible commitment to a stable system of law is not divisible in the eye of the
investor. A rule-of-law government may have even more to lose from non-
compliance with an international legal obligation than a more capricious
regime.
Perhaps no question has plagued scholars of international institutions as
persistently as the challenge to demonstrate that such institutions directly
affect state behavior. Does international law order state action? How can we
know that governments have not simply committed to do things that they
would have done even in the absence of rules? How can we be sure that the
rules are not epiphenomenal of behavior rather than a constraint on future
behavior? "Proof' of such propositions is probably not possible, but evidence
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has been presented here that addresses such skepticism. Once we control for
most of the obvious reasons a government might choose to restrict its current
account, article VIII status still emerges as a truly significant influence on the
probability of choosing to restrict. An article VIII country facing external
economic pressures and business cycle conditions matching those of a
similarly situated article XIV country manages much more often to avoid
implementing restrictions to cope with these pressures. This is not simply due
to Fund pressure attached to credits, nor is it an artifact of the exchange rate
regime. We should continue to entertain alternative explanations, but these
tests indicate that a legal commitment may carry decisive weight in
determining some states' international monetary policy.
These results also have broader implications for international law
compliance. They seem to point to a conclusion that international law matters
because legal obligations systematically raise and focus public and private
actors' expectations about governmental behavior. The making of legal
commitments may not be the only way to do this, but it is a broadly
recognized, socially interpretable effort to signal a government's policy
intentions. Once made, such commitments are honored, but not because
governments have an inherent respect for legal institutions (least of all
international ones). Rather, the results presented here suggest that
governments are keenly aware of the impact that non-compliance will have on
their reputation, affecting their appeal as a venue for conducting international
transactions within a reasonably stable legal framework that protects property
rights.
It is straightforward to think about international economic law as an
example of market-enforced rule compliance. It is not hard to imagine how
the basic mechanism described here could be at play in a study of the effects
of bilateral investment agreements, preferential trade arrangements, or trade
dispute settlement. But the work here suggests that the basic mechanism may
have broader applicability. It is useful to begin thinking about why and to
what extent governments may expect to encounter various kinds of costs
associated with non-compliance. In some cases, market-related costs should
be the focus of attention, as is obviously appropriate in the case of
international monetary law. Yet there may be market-related costs in less
obvious policy areas. Human rights may provide an example, as long as
information on governmental activities is available and a public norm that
does not tolerate clear abuses exists. There are, however, many regulatory
areas in which market forces are the problem rather than the solution, as in
international drug trafficking and money laundering. It would be the height of
na'vet6 to assume that market actors can be counted upon to boycott
governments that ignore their international legal commitments. The extent to
which markets can be used to achieve broader social purposes depends on the
extent to which the objective purposes and the objective of a narrow range of
private interests are compatible.
Further research should focus on even broader conceptualizations of
reputational costs that can flow from non-compliance with international legal
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obligations. Much more attention should be given to domestic audience costs,
or the domestic political fallout a government might experience should it
decide to renege on an international legal commitment. Certainly, some cases
will call for an analysis of domestic groups opposing the substantive policy
stand represented by breach of an obligation (e.g., free traders will oppose
protectionism, environmentalists will oppose unabated pollution, pacifists will
oppose the use of force). But beyond this, it may be fruitful to think about the
conditions under which a government's disregard for internationally
principled constraints might be opposed by a polity worried about a similar
disregard for (equally unenforceable) constitutional constraints at home. What
does international law violation do to a government's domestic legitimacy?
Does it spur nationalist support in the short run, but damage its credibility at
home in the long run?
The role of reputational considerations has long been central to our
impressions of why international law is generally obeyed, despite the lack of
centralized enforcement. This research suggests that reputations are
situational. In some sense this is obvious; a reputation has no meaning outside
of a specific social context. But it is surprising how little attention researchers
have given to the clustering of legal commitments in time and space. Where
do governments pick up their cues on appropriate behavior? How do they
decide the time is right to commit themselves to a multilateral treaty? How do
they decide when non-compliance will be tolerated, and when it will not? It is
impossible to deny that national decision makers are looking for external cues
of what is expected of them. But to date, little work has been done to
understand the various channels or networks that might help to explain the
"momentum ' 141 or the apparently "contingent compliance ' 142 that this and
other studies have uncovered.
It is evident that scholarship has only begun to scratch the surface of the
broader explanations for sovereign governments' willingness to make legally
binding, potentially politically costly commitments. This study has gone some
distance toward testing a particular conception of international law as a
commitment device enforced through decentralized market forces that loath
legal uncertainty. Viewed in this way, the evidence points to international
legal commitment as an important influence on state behavior.
141. Michael J. Glennon & Alison L. Stewart, The United States: Taking Environmental
Treaties Seriously, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 16, at 173, 189, 203.
142. MARGARETLEvj, CONSENT, DISSENT, AND PATRIOTISM 17-27 (1997).
